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Abstract
The increasing use of computing devices for social interactions propels the proliferation
of online social applications, yet, it prompts a number of privacy concerns. One common
problem occurs when two unfamiliar users, in the process of establishing social relation-
ships, want to assess their social proximity by discovering mutual contacts. In this paper,
we introduce Private Contact Discovery, a novel cryptographic primitive that lets two users,
on input their respective contact lists, learn their common contacts (if any), and nothing
else. We present an efficient and provably secure construction, that (i) prevents arbitrary
list manipulation by means of contact certification, and (ii) guarantees user authentication
and revocability. Following a rigorous cryptographic treatment of the problem, we define
the privacy-protecting contact-hiding property and prove it for our solution, under the RSA
assumption in the Random Oracle Model (ROM). We also show that other related crypto-
graphic techniques, such as Private Set Intersection and Secret Handshakes, are unsuitable
in this context. Experimental analysis attests to the practicality of our technique, which
achieves computational and communication overhead (almost) linear in the number of con-
tacts.
1 Introduction
The increasing volume of electronic social interactions motivates the need for efficient privacy-
enhancing techniques. One interesting problem occurs when two unfamiliar users want to pri-
vately discover their common contacts: in doing so, they would like to reveal to each other only
the contacts that they share.
We focus, for instance, on the discovery of mutual social-network friends. Online social
networks provide friends with services to share interests, activities, or pictures, and help them
build and reflect social relations. Popular social network websites, such as Facebook, Linkedin,
or MySpace, involve millions of active users, who access their services ubiquitously — e.g., 250
of 500 million Facebook users access it from their mobile devices [39]. Other projects, such
as Nokia’s Awarenet [1], aim at letting users in physical proximity interact using their mobile
phones, without relying on a central server or using an Internet connection.
One of the first steps toward establishing social-network relationships is to verify the ex-
istence of common friends. Consider the following settings: (1) a social network user wants
to extend her network and is willing to establish friendships with other users with whom she
has mutual friends; (2) a mobile phone user would like to interact with other users in physical
proximity (e.g., in a bar or on the subway), given that they have some common friends on a
∗An earlier version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of 9th International Conference on Applied
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given social network, e.g., Facebook. One crucial problem, in these scenarios, is discovering
mutual friends in a privacy-preserving manner.
A na¨ıve solution would require users to reveal their friends to each other. Clearly, this would
not preserve users’ privacy, since their complete lists would be exposed. Another trivial solution
would employ and trust a central server to find and output the common friends. However, a
central server is not necessarily trusted and not always available. Also, such a server would
learn not only users’ friends, but also which users become friends, how, when, and where. For
instance, in scenario (2) above, mobile phone users might be willing to discover their mutual
friends on a social network (e.g., Facebook) but may not be connected to the Internet or they
may want to operate outside the social network website.
In order to protect privacy, we are faced with a couple of fundamental issues. First, we
need to prevent a malicious user from manipulating her list of friends, e.g., by populating it
with her best guesses of other user’s list to maximize the amount of information learned, or by
“impersonating” unwarranted friendships. Then, as friend relationships may vary over time, we
need an efficient mechanism allowing to revoke friendships.
In this paper, we introduce the concept of Private Contact Discovery, a novel general
construct geared to preserve user privacy, not only in social network interactions, but also in
any other application that uses personal contact lists. We design a cryptographic primitive
involving two users, e.g., Alice and Bob, on input their contact lists, that outputs only the list
of mutual contacts (if any). The protocol prevents users from claiming unwarranted friendships
by introducing contact certification. For instance, in order to include Carol in her contact
list, Alice needs to obtain a certificate from Carol attesting this friendship. Then, when Alice
interacts with Bob, not only the entries in her contact list are hidden from Bob, but also the
possession of corresponding certificates with respect to non-common friends (and vice-versa).
Note that, in our solution, these certificates are specific to individual users, i.e. malicious transfer
of certificates, e.g. to enable others to claim unwarranted friendship, is impossible. Our protocol
does not require any trusted server nor is bound to a specific network infrastructure, and can
be used in both centralized and distributed environments.
1.1 Private Contact Discovery with Available Tools?
The problem of Private Contact Discovery bears some resemblance with several crypto-
graphic constructs. We review them below and discuss why they are inappropriate for the
problem of Private Contact Discovery.
Private Set Intersection (PSI). PSI techniques, e.g. [2, 13–15, 20, 23, 24, 29, 30], allow two
parties to compute the intersection of their input sets, such that they learn nothing beyond
the intersection (and the set sizes). However, PSI does not prevent parties from manipulating
their inputs, thus, in the context of contact discovery, it would not prevent users from claiming
unwarranted friendships.
Authorized PSI (APSI). APSI [14,15] extends PSI by ensuring that inputs are authorized by
an appropriate Certification Authority (CA). Thus, unless they hold authorizations on their in-
puts (typically, in the form of digital signatures), parties do not learn whether the corresponding
input belongs to the set intersection. Similarly, Private Intersection of Certified Sets [10] allows
a trusted CA to ensure that all protocol inputs in PSI are valid and bound to each protocol par-
ticipant. Note, however, that these constructs involve one single CA, whereas, every user in the
context of Contact Discovery would have to act as an independent “CA” for her contacts. Also,
one may think that the social network provider could certify friendships, but such a solution
would incur a fundamental problem. In fact, in APSI, authorizations are signatures: assuming
that Alice and Bob are both friends with Carol, Alice would have a signature on a message in
the form of “Carol→Alice”, while Bob would have one on “Carol→Bob”. Therefore, since (Autho-
rized) Private Set Intersection techniques only output matching elements, we cannot use them
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for privately discovering common contacts (as messages representing common friendships would
not match).
Secure Two-Party Computation. Generic secure two-party computation, e.g. [21, 32, 42],
allows two parties with respective private inputs x and y to compute a functionality f(x, y) =
(f1(x, y), f2(x, y)) such that: one party obtains f1(x, y) and the other receives f2(x, y), while
neither learns more than its own input and the output. The functionality underlying Private
Contact Discovery would require malicious model and could, possibly, be expressed and solved
using general secure two-party computation techniques. However, the expected computational
and communication overhead would be too large (possibly thousands of rounds of interaction)
and thus not be applicable in practice.
Anonymous Credentials (AC). AC schemes, e.g. [7,9], allow a provider to issue to a user an
anonymous credential on various attributes. The user can then prove to a third party that she
possesses valid credentials issued by that provider, yet without revealing further information
about credentials and attributes. AC schemes do not seem to offer an immediate solution to
Private Contact Discovery. Indeed, one could think that user’s friends may act as providers
issuing friendship credentials, however, AC proofs would disclose information about credential
issuers. For the same reason, Credential-Authenticated Key Exchange [8] does not provide an
immediate solution to the Private Contact Discovery problem.
Affiliation-Hiding Authentication (AHA). AHA protocols, also called Secret Handshakes
(SH) [3, 11, 26, 28, 41], allow two parties with membership credentials issued by the same orga-
nization, called Group Authority (GA), to privately authenticate each other. Specifically, one
party can prove to the other that it has a valid credential, yet this proof hides the identity
of the issuing organization, unless the other party also has a valid credential from the same
organization. Some protocols [6, 27, 33] efficiently support multiple credentials, i.e, multiple
Group Authorities, and are more closely related to the Contact Discovery problem. Specifically,
Jarecki and Liu [27] introduced a multiple-credential Affiliation-Hiding Authentication scheme,
with overhead (almost) linear in the number of credentials, secure under GapDH assumption.
Recently, Manulis, Pinkas, and Poettering [33] proposed another efficient multiple-credential
AHA scheme, secure under RSA assumption. One could think that Private Contact Discov-
ery can be solved using efficient multiple-credential AHAs. For instance, every user could act
as a GA and issue credentials as a contact certification: whenever two users want to discover
whether or not they have common contacts, they execute AHA on input their credentials. How-
ever, this approach would incur several problems. In fact, multiple-credential AHA schemes,
such as [27,33], assume that GAs are unconditionally trusted and always follow protocol specifi-
cation. While this assumption might be realistic in classic AHA scenarios (where GAs are courts
or investigation agencies), it is not reasonable, in the context of Contact Discovery, to trust all
users, e.g., of a social network. Consider the case of [27]: in the process of obtaining credentials
from GAs, users need to surrender all their secret keys which are not dependent on the specific
group but are valid for all of them. If Eve certifies Bob to be her friend, she would obtain Bob’s
secret keys, thus, she would be able to impersonate Bob and/or test Bob’s friendship with other
users. Although recent results in [35, 36] relax some of the trust assumptions on GAs in AHA
protocols, it is not clear how to efficiently extend them to the multiple-credential setting.
Friend-of-Friend. Prior work has attempted to solve problems similar to the one considered
in this paper. Von Arb et al. [40] present a mobile social networking platform which enables
Friend-of-Friend (FoF) detection in physical proximity. Matching of friend lists is provided
using PSI techniques [25, 29]. As discussed earlier, this approach fails to effectively guarantee
privacy, as contact lists can be artificially expanded. Freedman and Nicolosi [19] propose two
solutions for the FoF problem, in the context of trust establishment in email whitelisting. One
solution is based on hash functions and symmetric encryptions, the other on bilinear maps.
Both solutions leverage friendship attestation but do not support user revocation — a necessary
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requirement in our context. Also note that, as opposed to our protocol: (1) their solution based
on symmetric encryption allows users to maliciously transfer attestations to other users, and
(2) their technique using bilinear maps is inefficient, as it involves a quadratic number of bilinear
map operations.
Non-Cryptographic Techniques. Besides the work focusing on protecting privacy by means
of cryptographic techniques, some solutions targeting the discovery of common contacts have
been proposed in different and broader contexts. Some techniques address the Friend-of-Friend
problem with none or unclear privacy properties [12, 31]. Other solutions analyze, to a higher
extent, social relationships, without focusing on privacy. For instance, [38] uses random walks
to discover communities in large social-network graphs, [43, Chapter 12] formalizes the problem
of dynamically identifying core communities (i.e., sets of entities with frequent and consistent
interactions), [44] builds a prediction model to identify certain social structures, e.g., friendship
ties and family circles, while [17] attempts at identifying communications that substantiate
social relationship types.
Remark 1. Private Contact Discovery can be used as an important building block for privacy-
preserving social interactions. Indeed, although prior work has focused on privacy concerns in
this context, we highlight the need for a cryptographic treatment of them to obtain clear guaran-
tees. This includes formal definition of privacy goals and design of provably secure and practical
solutions. Also, Gu¨nther, Manulis, and Strufe [22] recently proposed a cryptographic model and
solutions for Private User Profiles, another building block for privacy in social interactions.
1.2 Contribution and Organization
Our contributions are manifold: First, we define Private Contact Discovery, a novel cryp-
tographic tool that allows two users to discover their common contacts, without leaking in-
formation on any other contacts, and without relying on any (trusted) third parties. Second,
we provide rigorous privacy definitions and security model for this new notion. In particular,
we define its main privacy goal called Contact-Hiding. Finally, we propose a very efficient so-
lution, secure under the RSA assumption in ROM, which also supports efficient revocation.
Performance analysis attests to the practicality of our protocol, which incurs almost linear com-
putational and communication complexities in the number of alleged contacts. This efficiency
stems from the use of the recent Index-Hiding Message Encoding (IHME) scheme [33,34].
Paper Organization. After preliminaries in Section 2, we introduce Private Contact Discovery
and present our solution, alongside its performance analysis, in Section 3. Next, in Section 4, we
formalize the security model for Private Contact Discovery and state Contact-Hiding security
of our scheme. Section 5 concludes the paper and provides an outlook into further research
directions. In Appendix, we present the proof of Contact-Hiding security of our solution.
2 Preliminaries: Assumptions and Building Blocks
Definition 1 (RSA Assumption on Safe Moduli) Let RSA-G(κ′) be a probabilistic algo-
rithm that outputs pairs (N, e), where N = PQ for random κ′-bit primes P 6= Q such that
P = 2P ′ + 1, Q = 2Q′ + 1 for primes P ′, Q′, and e ∈ Zϕ(N) is coprime to ϕ(N). The RSA-
success probability of a PPT solver A is defined as
SuccrsaA (κ′) = Pr
[
(N, e)← RSA-G(κ′); z $← ZN ; m← A(N, e, z); me = z (modN)
]
.
The RSA assumption on Safe Moduli states that the maximum RSA-success probability Succrsa(κ′)
(defined over all PPT solvers A) is negligible in κ′.
4
One important building block of our protocol is an Index-Hiding Message Encoding (IHME)
scheme, recently introduced by Manulis, Pinkas, and Poettering [33], which we review below.
Definition 2 recalls the underlying concept of Index-Based Message Encoding (IBME), also
introduced in [33]. It is an encoding technique that combines a set of indexed input messages,
m1, . . . ,mn ∈ M (where M is a message space), into a single data structure S. Any message
can be individually recovered from S using its index, which is arbitrarily chosen from an index
set I, and specified at encoding-time.
Definition 2 (Index-Based Message Encoding) An index-based message encoding scheme
(iEncode, iDecode) over an index space I and a message space M consists of two efficient algo-
rithms:
iEncode(P): On input a tuple of index/message pairs P = {(i1,m1), . . . , (in,mn)} ⊆ I ×M,
with distinct indices i1, . . . , in, this algorithm outputs an encoding S.
iDecode(S, i): On input of an encoding S and an index i ∈ I this algorithm outputs a message
m ∈M.
An index-based message encoding scheme is correct if iDecode(iEncode(P), ij) = mj for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and all tuples P = {(i1,m1), . . . , (in,mn)} ⊆ I ×M with distinct indices ij.
Further, [33] defines IBME schemes that guarantee index-hiding security as ‘Index-Hiding
Message Encoding’ (IHME) schemes. Informally, an IHME scheme guarantees that no adver-
sary, by inspecting an IBME structure S that encodes random messages, can learn any useful
information about the deployed indices, even if she knows some of the indices and/or messages.
We refer to [33] for the formal definition of the index-hiding property. Here we only recall the
polynomial-based construction of perfect IHME from [33]. It is defined over I =M = F for an
arbitrary finite field F (e.g., F = GF (p) as in [33]) and provides the index-hiding property in an
information-theoretic sense.
iEncode(P): On input of P = {(i1,m1), . . . , (in,mn)} ⊆ I ×M = F2, the encoding is defined
as the list S = (cn−1, . . . , c0) of coefficients of the polynomial f =
∑n−1
k=0 ckx
k ∈ F[x] that
interpolates all points in P, i.e. f(ij) = mj for all (ij ,mj) ∈ P. Note that this polynomial
exists uniquely, i.e., the iEncode algorithm is deterministic.
iDecode(S, i): On input of S = (cn−1, . . . , c0) and index i ∈ I, this algorithm outputs the
evaluation m = f(i) =
∑n−1
k=0 cki
k of f at position i.
Our protocol deploys the IHME scheme in a black-box way, thus proposing another application
of this recent primitive. Furthermore, in our experimental analysis, we will also take into
account recent optimizations regarding the improved polynomial interpolation algorithms and
implementation of the IHME scheme presented in [34].
3 Private Contact Discovery
3.1 Contact Discovery: Syntax and Correctness
A Contact Discovery Scheme CDS is defined as a tuple of four algorithms and protocols:
Init(1κ): This algorithm is executed once by each user U . On input of a security parameter
1κ, it initializes internal parameters U.params and clears U ’s contact revocation list, i.e.,
U.crl = ∅. U.crl is authenticated by U and will be distributed to other users (i.e., all
contacts of U should have access to the up-to-date U.crl). In contrast, U.params is private
to U .
5
AddContact(U ↔ V ): This is a protocol, executed between user U and user V , who wishes to
become a contact of U . User U adds identity of V to her contact list. In addition, a
corresponding contact certificate ccU→V is output to V . Note that we model contact
establishment as a unidirectional process: If U should become a contact of V as well then
they additionally will execute AddContact(V ↔ U).
RevokeContact(U, V ): This algorithm is executed by user U . On input identity of V , the contact
revocation list of U is updated to U.crl← U.crl ∪ {V }.
Discover(V ↔ V ′): This is an interactive algorithm (protocol), executed between users V and
V ′, to discover common contacts. V ’s private input is (role,CL, partner), where role ∈
{init, resp} specifies the role of the session as initializer or responder, contact list CL is
a set of pairs of the form (U, ccU→V ), for some users U , and partner is the name/id
of the supposed protocol partner. All values ccU→V are contact certificates previously
obtained as output of AddContact(U ↔ V ). V ′’s private input is (role′,CL′, partner′),
defined analogously. Further, users keep track of the state of created Discover(role,CL,
partner) protocol sessions pi through session variables that are initialized as follows: (pi.role,
pi.CL, pi.partner)← (role,CL, partner), pi.state← running, pi.SCL← ∅, and pi.id is set to the
own identity. After the protocol completes, pi.state is updated to either rejected or accepted.
In the latter case, shared contact list pi.SCL holds a non-empty set of user identifiers.
Definition 3 (Correctness of CDS) Assume that users V and V ′ interact in a Discover pro-
tocol on input (role,CL, partner) and (role′,CL′, partner′), respectively. Let pi and pi′ denote the
corresponding sessions. Let CL∩ denote the set of users (contacts) U that appear in both CL and
CL′ with the restriction that neither partner nor partner′ are contained in the respective contact
revocation lists. CDS scheme is correct if: (1) pi and pi′ complete in the same state, which is
accepted iff (role 6= role′ ∧ CL∩ 6= ∅ ∧ partner = pi′.id ∧ partner′ = pi.id), and (2) if the sessions
accept then pi.SCL = pi′.SCL = CL∩.
3.2 Protocol Specification
We now present our CDS construction and describe the instantiation of Init, AddContact,
RevokeContact, and Discover algorithms. We assume that AddContact sessions among (honest)
users of CDS are protected by secure channels, whereas, during Discover, the channel does
not need to be confidential. Note that many applications that would use CDS, such as social
networks or further group applications, already provide an authentication infrastructure for their
users, e.g., they deploy a PKI or use some password-based techniques. Such an authentication
infrastructure can then be used for various types of communication, including the execution of
CDS protocols. With this assumption in mind, we can now focus on the core functionality of
the CDS scheme, namely the private discovery of shared contacts, for which potential attacks
may be mounted by other application users, i.e., from the inside.
Let κ, κ′ ∈ N denote security parameters, where κ′ is polynomially dependent on κ. As a
building block, our construction utilizes the IHME = (iEncode, iDecode) scheme from [33] (see
also Section 2), defined over the finite field F = GF (p) ∼= Zp, where p is the smallest prime
number satisfying p > 22κ
′+κ. In addition, the protocol makes use of two hash functions
H : {0, 1}∗ → [0, p− 1] and H∗ : {0, 1}∗ → [0, p− 1],
modeled as random oracles. For convenience, for each N ∈ N of length 2κ′, we define:
HN : {0, 1}∗ → ZN ; x 7→ H∗(N ‖x) modN.
The four algorithms and protocols of CDS are instantiated as follows:
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Init(1κ). The setup routine run by each user U mainly consists of the generation of safe RSA
parameters. Given security parameter κ′, two κ′-bit safe primes P = 2P ′ + 1 and Q = 2Q′ + 1
are picked randomly. The RSA modulus is set to N = PQ, and a pair e, d ∈ Zϕ(N) is chosen
s.t. ed = 1 (modϕ(N)). Observe that ϕ(N) = (P − 1)(Q− 1) = 4P ′Q′.
The largest element order in Z×N is λ(N) = lcm(P − 1, Q− 1) = 2P ′Q′ = ϕ(N)/2. [26] and [35]
show that for half of the elements g ∈ Z×N it holds that ord(g) = λ(N) and −1 6∈ 〈g〉, i.e.,
Z×N ∼= 〈−1〉 × 〈g〉. Let Init() algorithm find such g ∈ Z×N (e.g., by random sampling and testing)
and assign U.params← (N, e, d, g).
Finally, the algorithm initializes U ’s contact revocation list by setting U.crl← ∅.
AddContact(U ↔ V ). In this protocol user U , on input U.params = (N, e, d, g) and identifier
id of a user V , computes contact certificate ccU→V = (N, e, g, σV ) with σV = (HN (id))d modN ,
i.e., the Full-Domain-Hash RSA signature [4] on id, and confidentially hands it out to V .
RevokeContact(U, V ). User U revokes given user V by inserting V into its contact revocation
list: U.crl ← U.crl ∪ {V }. It is assumed that an up-to-date version of this list is distributed
authentically to all contacts of U .
Discover(V ↔ V ′). The contact discovery protocol is executed between two users V and V ′
with inputs (role,CL, partner) and (role′,CL′, partner′), respectively (see Section 3.1 for a descrip-
tion of parameters). The protocol is specified in detail in Figure 1. Each user obtains its contact
list and, for each entry in it, parses the friendship certificate (lines 2–3). Next, our protocol
combines Okamoto’s technique [37] for RSA-based identity-based key agreement (lines 4–5 and
18) with a special padding scheme (introduced in [16]) to hide the size of deployed RSA-moduli
(lines 6–7 and 17). Note that several instances of Okamoto’s protocol are run in parallel — one
for each contact in contact list CL — and all transferred messages are IHME-encoded into a
single structure before transmission (lines 8 and 10). Upon receiving the IMHE-encoded struc-
ture, each user, for every unrevoked certificate, decodes the messages (line 16) and removes
the probabilistic padding applied in lines 6–7 (line 17). As we demonstrate in Section 3.3,
values r calculated in line 18 are equal for both protocol participants, when computed for the
same common contact. Confirmation messages (c0, c1) are derived from this value (lines 19–20),
IHME-encoded in lines 23–24, and verified after the last communication round (line 28). Each
common contact is then added to the SCL list (line 29). Note that contact revocation is handled
in lines 15 and 22. Finally, the protocol terminates with “accepted”, unless SCL is empty, in
which case “rejected” is returned (lines 31-34).
3.3 Protocol Correctness
Suppose that users V, V ′ have valid contact certificates ccU→V , ccU→V ′ , respectively, for a
shared contact U . Then ccU→V = (N, e, g, σV ) and ccU→V ′ = (N, e, g, σV ′) for common parame-
ter set N, e, g. In a Discover(V ↔ V ′) protocol session, V would receive ϑ = (−1)b′gt′σV ′ from V ′
(lines 5 and 17) and compute r = (ϑe/HN (partner))2t (line 18). From σV ′ = HN (partner)d modN
(see AddContact protocol) it follows that r = g2ett
′
. User V ′ obtains the same value r by exe-
cuting analogous computations (with partner′ and t′). The protocol’s correctness is now implied
by IHME’s correctness, and verifiable by inspection of Figure 1. The security analysis of the
protocol is postponed to Section 4.3, after the specification of the security model.
3.4 Protocol Efficiency and Performance Analysis
We now discuss the efficiency of our CDS construction. We focus on the protocol Discover
since Init is run only once per user, while AddContact and RevokeContact are executed only once
for each added or removed contact, respectively, and can be performed off-line.
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V on input (init,CL, partner):
P ← ∅, T ← ∅
for all (U, ccU→V ) ∈ CL:
parse ccU→V as (N, e, g, σV )
(b, t)←R Z2 × ZN/2
ϑ← (−1)bgtσV modN
k ←R [ 0, ⌊p/N⌋ − 1 ]
θ ← ϑ+ kN
P ← P ∪ {(N, θ)}
T ← T ∪ {(U,N, e, t)}
MV ← iEncode(P)
sid←MV ‖MV ′
P ′ ← ∅, T ′ ← ∅
for all (U,N, e, t) ∈ T :
if partner 6∈ U.crl:
θ ← iDecode(MV ′ , N)
ϑ← θmodN
r ← (ϑe/HN (partner))2tmodN
c0 ← H(sid‖r‖0)
c1 ← H(sid‖r‖1)
T ′ ← T ′ ∪ {(U,N, c1)}
else: c0 ←R [ 0, p− 1 ]
P ′ ← P ′ ∪ {(N, c0)}
M′V ← iEncode(P ′)
SCL← ∅
for all (U,N, c1) ∈ T ′:
if c1 = iDecode(M′V ′ , N):
SCL← SCL ∪ {U}
if SCL 6= ∅ then
terminate with “accept”
else
terminate with “reject”
MV−−−−−−−→
MV ′←−−−−−−−−
M′V−−−−−−−→
M′V ′←−−−−−−−−
V ′ on input (resp,CL′, partner′):
P ← ∅, T ← ∅
for all (U, ccU→V ′) ∈ CL′:
parse ccU→V ′ as (N, e, g, σV ′)
(b, t)←R Z2 × ZN/2
ϑ← (−1)bgtσV ′ modN
k ←R [ 0, ⌊p/N⌋ − 1 ]
θ ← ϑ+ kN
P ← P ∪ {(N, θ)}
T ← T ∪ {(U,N, e, t)}
MV ′ ← iEncode(P)
sid←MV ‖MV ′
P ′ ← ∅, T ′ ← ∅
for all (U,N, e, t) ∈ T :
if partner′ 6∈ U.crl:
θ ← iDecode(MV , N)
ϑ← θmodN
r ← (ϑe/HN (partner′))2tmodN
c0 ← H(sid‖r‖0)
c1 ← H(sid‖r‖1)
T ′ ← T ′ ∪ {(U,N, c0)}
else: c1 ←R [ 0, p− 1 ]
P ′ ← P ′ ∪ {(N, c1)}
M′V ′ ← iEncode(P ′)
SCL← ∅
for all (U,N, c0) ∈ T ′:
if c0 = iDecode(M′V , N):
SCL← SCL ∪ {U}
if SCL 6= ∅ then
terminate with “accept”
else
terminate with “reject”
Figure 1: Specification of Discover(V ↔ V ′).
3.4.1 Computational Complexity and Bandwidth Requirements
The computational complexity of the Discover protocol is essentially related to the number
of (relatively more expensive) exponentiations, executed for each contact in lines 5 and 18. Any
user V needs to compute 2|CLV | modular exponentiations with modulus size 2κ′, where |CLV |
denotes the number of contacts of V . If the polynomial-based IHME constructions from [33]
or [34] are used to encode messages, the polynomial interpolations and evaluations only require
inexpensive operations, such as multiplications in F. Specifically, the number of multiplications
in F would amount to O(|CLV |2) and O(|CLV | · |CLV ′ |), respectively, where V ′ denotes the
protocol partner. Nevertheless, the corresponding workload can be considered small in practice,
as discussed in [33,34].
The CRL-based check for revocation of partner’s pseudonym in line 15 can be implemented
in logarithmic complexity (assuming sorted crls). Note that users need to keep revocation lists of
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(a) AMD Neo and Intel Xeon (b) ARMv7
Figure 2: Running times of our Discover protocol on different CPUs with an increasing number
of contacts. For each CPU, we consider session-independent (off-line) precomputations from [34].
All measurements are performed for 80-bit (symmetric) security and 1024-bit RSA moduli.
their contacts up-to-date. In practice, this does not impose a significant overhead, as revocation
lists grow incrementally and include only (short) identifiers of revoked contacts. Thus, the
related communication overhead is negligible compared to that of an actual Discover session.
The overall communication complexity of the Discover protocol (including the IHME-encoded
transmission) is linear in the number of contacts. More precisely, each user sends and receives
in total approximately 2(|CLV |+ |CLV ′ |)(2κ′ + κ) bits. Observe that this value can be lowered
to 2(|CLV | + |CLV ′ |)(κ′ + κ) by shortening confirmation messages c0, c1 to κ bits, in lines 19
and 20 (see also [34]).
3.4.2 Experimental Analysis
In addition to our asymptotic analysis, we also measured the performance of our scheme,
experimentally. To this end, we conducted several experiments involving laptops and mobile
devices. Our prototypes use the recent optimizations to IHME scheme, proposed by Manulis
and Poettering [34].
Following [34], for |CL| < 100, the overall costs of running the protocol is dominated by the
time consumed in the exponentiations, when related to IHME encoding. If certain IHME-related
precomputations from [34] are possible, then this bound increases to |CL| < 250. Therefore, the
computational overhead of our CDS construction is, in practice, almost linear in the number of
contacts.
Figure 2 presents running times of our Discover protocol, using different CPUs: a single
core of an Intel XEON 2.6GHz CPU, an AMD NEO 1.6GHz processor (often found in Netbook
computers), and an ARMv7 600MHz CPU (installed on many today’s smartphones). All mea-
surements were performed using the GMP library [18], thus, execution on smartphones can be
even speeded up using different cryptographic libraries optimized for mobile environments.
We observe that our protocol for Private Contact Discovery scales fairly well. For security
level (κ, 2κ′) = (80, 1024), i.e., 80-bit symmetric security and 1024-bit RSA moduli, on laptops
and server machines, a full protocol execution requires less than a second, even for 100 or more
contacts per user. On cores with smaller footprint, e.g., on recent smartphones like Nokia’s N900
(equipped with the ARMv7 600MHz processor), protocol execution with 100 contacts requires
about 5 seconds, which is an acceptable overhead. Note that smartphones’ CPU speeds are
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envisioned to increase rapidly in the near future (e.g., the iPhone 4G is already equipped with a
1GHz processor). Finally, we computed that each user sends and receives around 300 Bytes per
user of his contact list, where we assume |CLV | = |CLV ′ | for simplicity. That is, in the protocol
execution with 100 contacts, a total of 30KB is transmitted.
We conclude that our Private Contact Discovery solution is efficient and practical enough
for actual deployment, also on smartphones widely available today. Yet, our technique does not
give up solid privacy guarantees, as we show in the next section.
4 Security Model for Contact Discovery Protocols
In this section, we introduce our security model for a Contact Discovery Scheme (CDS). We
formalize this notion by describing adversarial capabilities and defining Contact-Hiding security.
Finally, we analyze the properties of our scheme with respect to this model.
4.1 Adversary Model
The adversary A is modeled as a PPT machine interacting with protocol participants and
having access to the following set of queries, where U denotes the set of honest users in the
system.
Discover(U, role,CL, partner) : This query results in initiating, on behalf of user U ∈ U , a new
session pi of Discover. Query’s input is a role identifier role ∈ {init, resp}, a contact list
CL ⊆ U of users, and an identifier partner of the protocol partner. Query’s output is a
first protocol message M (if available).
Send(pi,M) : With this query, message M is delivered to session pi. After processing M , the
output (if any) is given to A. The query is ignored if pi is not waiting for input.
Reveal(pi) : This query is ignored if pi.state = running. Otherwise, the query returns (pi.state,
pi.SCL).
RevealCC(V,U) : This query gives the adversary contact certificate ccU→V of user V for contact
U . It models the possibility of selective contact corruptions.
Revoke(U, V ) : This query lets user U include user V in its contact revocation list U.crl.
4.2 Contact-Hiding Security
Informally, the Contact-Hiding property protects users from disclosing non-matching con-
tacts to other participants. We model CH-security with a game, following the indistinguisha-
bility approach. The goal of the adversary is to decide which of two contact lists, CL∗0 or CL
∗
1,
is used by some challenge session pi∗. The adversary can also invoke any number of Discover
sessions, and perform Reveal and RevealCC queries at will.
Definition 4 (Contact-Hiding Security) Let CDS = {Init,AddContact,
RevokeContact,Discover}, b be a randomly chosen bit, and Q = {Discover, Send,Reveal,RevealCC,
Revoke} denote the set of queries the adversary A has access to. We consider the following game
between a challenger and the adversary A:
Gamech,bA,CDS(κ, n) :
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• The challenger creates n users, denoted by U = {U1, . . . , Un}. The adversary A specifies
a set Uc ⊆ U of initially corrupted users. Let Uh = U \ Uc. Init(1κ) is run for all U ∈ Uh,
and, for all combinations (U, V ) ∈ Uh × Uh, contact certificates ccU→V are created by
respective user U and given to V , each time by running the AddContact(U ↔ V ) protocol.
For all U ∈ Uc, the adversary sets up all parameters himself, including U.crl. He then
specifies a list L ⊆ Uh×Uc, and for all (U, V ) ∈ L, protocol AddContact(U, V ) is run, and
the respective certificate ccU→V is given to A;
• AQ interacts with all (honest) users using the queries in Q; at some point AQ outputs a
tuple (U∗, role∗,CL∗0,CL
∗
1, partner
∗) where U∗ ∈ Uh, role∗ ∈ {init, resp}, CL∗0,CL∗1 ⊆ Uh with
|CL∗0| = |CL∗1|, and partner∗ is any user id (in U). Set D∗ = (CL∗0 \ CL∗1) ∪ (CL∗1 \ CL∗0) =
(CL∗0 ∪ CL∗1) \ (CL∗0 ∩ CL∗1) is called the distinguishing set;
• the challenger invokes a Discover(U∗, role∗,CL∗b , partner∗) session pi∗ (and provides all
needed credentials);
• AQ continues interacting via queries (including on session pi∗) until it terminates and
outputs bit b′;
• the output of the game is b′ if all of the following hold; else the output is 0:
(a) if there is a Discover session pi′ with D∗∩pi′.CL 6= ∅ and (pi′.id, pi′.partner) = (pi∗.partner, pi∗.id)
which was in state running while pi∗ was in state running, then neither Reveal(pi∗) nor
Reveal(pi′) was asked,
(b) for no U ∈ D∗ a RevealCC(partner∗, U) query has been posed or a pair (U, partner∗)
is contained in L, i.e. the adversary did not ask for a contact certificate for partner∗
issued by any user in the distinguishing set.
We define
AdvchA,CDS(κ, n) :=
∣∣∣Pr [Gamech,0A,CDS(κ, n) = 1]− Pr [Gamech,1A,CDS(κ, n) = 1]∣∣∣
and denote with AdvchCDS(κ, n) the maximum advantage over all PPT adversaries A. We say
that CDS is CH-secure if this advantage is negligible in κ (for all n polynomially dependent on
κ).
Conditions (a) and (b) exclude some trivial attacks on contact hiding. Condition (a) thwarts
the attack where A starts a Discover(U ′, role′,CL′, partner′) session pi′ with CL′ ∩ D∗ 6= ∅ and
(pi′.id, pi′.partner) = (pi∗.partner, pi∗.id), relays all messages between pi∗ and pi′, and finally asks
Reveal(pi∗) or Reveal(pi′). By protocol correctness, pi∗.SCL = pi′.SCL would contain elements
from D∗, and it would be trivial to correctly decide about b. Condition (b) prevents A to ask
for a contact certificate issued by a user U ∈ D∗ for a user V ∈ U , to simulate a protocol session
on behalf of V , to relay all messages between that session and pi∗, and to decide about bit b
from the results.
Remark 2. One may also define a stronger notion of contact-hiding by requiring that distinct
sessions of the Discover protocol executed by the same user remain unlinkable. We observe that
our Discover protocol in its plain form would not guarantee such unlinkability, since credentials
(i.e., certified friendships) are re-used across multiple protocol executions, which also allows an
efficient realization. Although linkable protocols may yield traceability concerns (with respect
to eavesdropping adversaries) and leak sensitive information about users, we address this issue
by executing the protocol over secure (encrypted and authenticated) channels. Nonetheless, it
is an interesting open problem to design a Discover protocol, which would preserve the linear
complexity of our solution and, simultaneously, achieve such stronger property of unlinkability.
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4.3 Security Analysis of Our Protocol
Following the definition in Section 4.2, we argue that our CDS protocol, described in Sec-
tion 3, offers Contact-Hiding security. We refer to Appendix A for the proof.
Theorem 1 (Contact-Hiding Security) The CDS protocol in Section 3.2 is CH-secure un-
der the RSA assumption on safe moduli, in Random Oracle Model (ROM).
5 Conclusion
This paper motivated the importance, and introduced the concept of, Private Contact Dis-
covery. Following a cryptographic treatment of the problem, we presented an efficient and
provably secure construction. During protocol design, we overcame several challenges, such as
the arbitrary expansion of contact lists, by using contact certification. Our solution relies on
Full-Domain-Hash RSA signatures and on the recent IHME primitive [33]. We also showed,
through experimental evaluation, that our solution is practical enough to be deployed in real-
world applications, including those running on mobile devices.
Private Contact Discovery provides a valuable privacy-preserving tool that can serve as
building block for many collaborative applications, including popular social networks. Since
this work represents an initial foray into Private Contact Discovery, much remains to be done.
First, we plan to extend our techniques to privately discover communities: consider, for example,
two smartphone users in proximity willing to find out whether or not they are member of the
same social community (e.g., a Facebook group or an Awarenet community [1]), in a privacy-
preserving manner. Users may receive (from a community manager) credentials for community
membership, and execute our CDS protocol to discover common memberships. Then, we intend
to address the (privacy-preserving) discovery of i-th grade contacts and cliques [38], which
currently seems impossible without relying on some trusted third party. Another interesting
direction is to consider fairness [5] of the contact discovery process, a property that ensures a
balanced gain of knowledge of protocol participants even against insider adversaries.
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A Proof of Contact-Hiding Security of CDS from Fig. 1
We now prove the Contact-Hiding (CH) security (Definition 4) of our CDS protocol (illus-
trated in Fig. 1), relying on the RSA assumption on safe moduli (Definition 1) and on the
security of the IHME scheme from [33]. By AdvihideIHME(κ) we denote the advantage probability
for breaking the index-hiding property of the IHME scheme, which (since the utilized IHME
scheme is perfect) is equal to 0. Note that our security arguments have similarities with those
of the multi-credential AHA protocol in [33], which proves the “affiliation hiding” property of
the proposed AHA under the same assumptions. We only sketch the proof steps that mirror
those in [33], as the reader can find more details in [33] and its predecessor [26]. In contrast,
we detail arguments regarding the use of the IHME scheme. We prove CH-Security of CDS by
presenting a sequence of games G0, . . . ,G5.
Game G0. We start with G0 = Game
ch,b
A,CDS(κ, n), in which A interacts with simulator C, which
answers all queries honestly according to the specification of the game (see Definition 4).
Game G1. Game G1 is like G0, except that the simulation is aborted (the game outputs 0) if
there exists a Discover session pi′ 6= pi∗ that sends out the same M structure as pi∗ (see line 10
in Figure 1).
Note thatM sent by pi∗ contains for each contact in CL∗b a specific θ value. These are almost
uniformly distributed in a set of size p ≈ 22κ′+κ. Thus, the probability of finding a collision in
theM’s is upper-bounded by qq/22κ′+κ (where qq denotes the number of Discover queries), and
thus negligible in κ.
Game G2. Let R = (r1, . . . , rk) denote the list of r-values for the contacts in CL∗b \ CL∗1−b =
CL∗b ∩D∗ of session pi∗, as computed in line 18 of the protocol. Game G2 is like G1, except that
all confirmation messages c0, c1 of pi∗ (see lines 19 and 20), computed based on the values in R,
are replaced by random elements in the respective range.
By the Random Oracle Model (ROM), the modification introduced in Game G2 can only be
detected by adversaries that can compute and query the H oracle on at least one of the r-values
in R. Let rt ∈ R be such a value (and assume that the simulator guesses t correctly). By
embedding an RSA challenge into user identifiers (by programming the HN oracle) and public
user parameters (by choosing N and g appropriately), the problem of computing rt can be
reduced to the hardness of the RSA problem (see [26, Section 3] for more details). We conclude
that the computational distance between G2 and G1 is polynomially dependent on Succrsa(κ′),
and is thus negligible in κ.
Remark 3. Note that for all contacts in CL∗b ∩D∗, the adversary A cannot distinguish correct
confirmation messages for pi∗ from random ones. Therefore, the output set pi∗.SCL is disjoint
with D∗.
Game G3. This game is like Game G2, except that, for session pi∗, the θ-values for all contacts
in CL∗b ∩ D∗ (as computed in line 7) are replaced by values uniformly random in [0, p− 1].
Observe from the protocol definition that the θ-values replaced in this game only affect
the computation of the rt ∈ R (in Game G2), which cannot be computed and checked by the
adversary anyway by a result of Game G2. Hence, the only detectable difference between G2 and
G3 may arise from different distributions of the original and the modified θ-values. Although
the original values are not uniformly distributed in [0, p − 1], their distribution is statistically
indistinguishable from the uniform distribution. In [26], the corresponding statistical difference
is proven to be bounded by 2−κ, what is negligible in κ.
Game G4. Game G4 is like G3, except that, for session pi∗, in the IHME-encoding step in
line 10, for all contacts in CL∗b ∩D∗, the indices N are replaced by the indices N that correspond
to the contacts in CL∗0 ∩D∗. For all contacts in CL∗b ∩ CL∗1−b the indices remain unchanged.
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As Games G3 and G4 are exactly the same in case b = 0 (as nothing has changed), in the
following we assume b = 1. We show that, if an efficient distinguisher D3,4 that distinguishes
between Game G3 and G4 exists, then we can use it to construct an adversary Aihide against
index-hiding of IHME as follows. Adversary Aihide acts as a challenger for D3,4 , i.e., Aihide sets
up all users, and answers all protocol queries honestly (but following the rules of Game G3),
with the only exception that the encoding step in line 10 for session pi∗ is performed by the
IHME challenger (i.e., the latter receives (I0, I1,M ′) where I0 and I1 are the sets of indices N of
CL∗0 and CL
∗
1, respectively, and M
′ is the list of the θ-values honestly computed for the contacts
in CL∗0 ∩ CL∗1), which returns an encoding M using either the indices corresponding to CL∗0 or
CL∗1. The bit output by D3,4 serves as output b′ for Aihide. We see that the success probability
of D3,4 is bounded by AdvihideIHME(κ), which is 0 (since the IHME construction is perfect). Hence,
the computational difference between Games G3 and G4 is 0.
Game G5. The step between Game G4 and G5 is very similar to the previous transition: this
time, it is the IHME-encoding in line 24 for which the indices N of all contacts in CL∗b ∩D∗ are
replaced by the indices N that correspond to the contacts in CL∗0 ∩D∗.
The difference between G5 and G4 is bounded by AdvihideIHME(κ) = 0, exactly for the same
reason above.
Conclusion. We conclude that the computational difference between G0 and G5 is negligible
in κ. Therefore, a CH-adversary cannot distinguish between Gamech,bA,CDS and Game
ch,0
A,CDS with
non-negligible probability, neither by analyzing the exchanged messages, nor by interpreting the
results of Reveal queries. As the latter game contains no information about bit b, it follows that
AdvchCDS(κ, n) is negligible in κ (for all n polynomially dependent on κ).
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